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WERE FRONTIER LANDS IN THE CENTRAL 
MEDITERRANEAN 'ISOLATED WORLDS'? 
THE ISLAND OF MALTA AS A CASE STUDY 
The Mediterranean State Boundaries 
In his book, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in 
the Reign 0/ Philip II, Fernand Braudel defines the islands of the 
Mediterranean as «isolated worlds» and «lands of hunger»1. These 
definitions carry pragmatic implications that may appear con-
tentious if put under the lens of micro-history. Braudel himself re-
cognizes the limitation of these statements, as he considers it appro~ 
priate to exclude Sicily from the above description. Indeed, such 
definitions, while carrying political and economic implications, do 
not necessarily reflect all the historical realities of the Mediter-
ranean islands, in particular if the latter happen to be frontier terri-
tories. In this paper, I propose to study these concepts within the 
framework of Maltese history, in particular from 1530s up to the 
early eighteenth century, when the island of Malta can really be said 
to exemplify the notion of 'frontier lands'. 
This is not the first study on the Braudelian idea of 'isolated 
worlds' as applicable to the Maltese island. Victor Mallia-Milanes 
studied this concept in relation to other Braudelian ideas, such as 
that of 'land of hunger' or that the inhabitants of such lands were 
'prisoners of their poverty>2. What I am proposing in this paper is 
to build on Mallia~Milanes' study entitled Was Early Modern Malta 
an (Isolated World?, and at the same time, relate this concept of 'iso-
lated worlds' to that of 'frontier territories'. 
These two concepts - 'isolated worlds' and 'frontier lands' - car-
1 E BRAU DEL , The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Reign of Philip 
II, Fontana, 1986, I, p. 152. 
2 V. MALLIA-MILANES, Was Early Modern Malta an (Isolated World'?, in «Peregrina-
tiones. Acta et Docwnenta», III, 2000, p. 23. 
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ry the impasse in which many islands found themselves in Early 
Modern Times. In other words, the multitude of small and not so 
small islands that pepper the Mediterranean did not possess suffi~ 
dent resources to maintain themselves but due to their geographical 
position, they still succeeded in being on the forefront of history. It 
is within this context that Braudel developed the above notions, 
thereby highlighting the lack of internal political power and the 
islands reliance on constant importation. 
Despite the fact that the Mediterranean islands had a precarious 
economy resulting from their restricted space and lack of security, 
Braudel expressed the idea that these isolated worlds had strategic 
value. In this context, these statements cease to sound contradictory 
or out of tune with historical realities. Indead they explain why 
these islands left an impact on historical events that far exceeded 
<<what might be expected from such poor territories»3. Braudel's ex-
planation is that these «islands lay on the paths of the great sea 
routes». This statement, succinct enough in itself, implies a totally 
different geographical dimension than the one currently applied in 
perception of this sea. Perhaps it is thanks to Braudel that the 
Mediterranean began to be perceived as a homogenous geographical 
basin. But the reality in the sixteenth century was different. The 
Mediterranean was a succession of small seas and these small islands 
were a vital communicating bridge4, especially along the transversal 
route, which was often dangerous and difficult. 
Such oxymoronic concepts designate Braudel's perspective that 
these small worlds did, in fact, begin to play an active role in the un-
folding of international relations during the sixteenth century. Many 
of these islands happened to find themselves on the borderlines of 
either the emerging Ottoman or Habsburg Empires. As the centre 
of power of these two empires lay at the two extreme ends of the 
Mediterranean, all forms of isolated worlds began to be threatened 
by these two political giants. At first, it was the isolated worlds situ-
ated close to their frontiers that fell under their spell; later the two 
powers' influence spread to the Central Mediterranean. 
Hence, within the political paradigm of a divided sea, the six-
teenth-century Mediterranean World was subjected to two principal 
types of boundaries. The first type was of an ideological nature. 
3 F. BRAUDEL, The Mediterranean cit., I, p. 154. 
4 F. BRAUDEL, The Mediterranean cit., I, p. 108. 
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Both these new emerging empires were the expression of religious 
antagonism. Religion played a dominant part. It was used by both 
the Ottoman and the Habsburg dynasties as a rallying cry but in 
reality, it was less important in the expansionist urge of both Em-
pires than one would have expected from a century that experienced 
the most feverish religious movements and persecutions. In other 
words, the Ottomans did not find difficulty in annexing territories 
belonging to brothers professing their same faith; nor did Catholic 
Spain hold back from suppressing revolting Christian provinces. 
The second type of boundary delineated what in modern jargon 
\vould be called an inter-state function: that is, the frontiers in ques-
tion were territorial borders that lacked an exact demarcation. These 
boundaries remained opaque up to the early eighteenth century5. To 
borrow Salvatore Bono's words, they «erano (. . .) a lungo come sem-
pliei indicazioni astratte senza corrispondenza nel paesaggio natura-
le ed umano e senza riscontro in una concreta linea lungo la quale si 
esereitassero Ie predette state-functions»6. 
In geo-political terms, these isolated worlds together with many of 
the European and North Mrican regencies, kingdoms and also em-
pires lacked exact delimitations of a theoretical nature that could 
concretise into boundary lines. Sixteenth-century borders can be de M 
scribed as artificial, if not fluid in nature. They originated from a hu-
man decision and were subject to the powerful claims that could be 
raised by any magnate who held the upper hand in the region. There 
were naturally marked boundaries such as rivers, streams, moun-
tains and the desert, whose historical impact has been amply di-
scussed by Braudel, but these only controlled part of the geographi-
cal asset. The true physical boundary was the sea. But its role in the 
delimitation of borders was nonetheless ambiguous. The same sea 
served either as a unifying factor or as a demarcation line. Like 
rivers, mountains or deserts, it could represent a physical demarca-
tion at which the territory of a kingdom, princedom or empire end-
ed. At the same time, the sea was a fluid medium that could easily be 
translated into a matrix for imperial expansion. Any state or king-
dom that succeeded in building a formidable navy, could automati-
cally lay claim or alter the ephemeral Mediterranean boundaries. 
5 S. BONO, Le frontiere in Africa dal/a spartizione coloniale alle vicende piu recen/i. 
1884-1971)~ilano, 1972,p.2. 
6 S. BONO, Le frontiere cit., p. 2. 
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Through the ages, any power aspiring to control this sea sought to 
extend its boundaries, by creating a tassel-like structure, where the 
unity of the state was not held by any compact land territory but by 
the building of different stations at strategic points held together by 
a mauradering navy. This was what both the Habsburg and the Os-
man dynasties sought to achieve. 
In their efforts to superimpose new boundaries on adjacent lands, 
both Spain and Turkey sought to annex neighbouring territory. This 
involved respectively the reign of Granada, and the Mameluk king-
dom of Egypt and Syria. Thereafter, the first territories to fall into 
their fold were the small isolated worlds situated next to their coasts 
or borders. The united Spanish monarchy started the ball rolling. 
The belligerence shown by Spain in conquering the 'isolated worlds' 
of Melilla in 1497, MersMel-Kebir in 1505, Penon de Velez in 1508, 
Oran in 1509, Mostaganem, Tlemcen, Tenes, Bugie and Tripoli in 
1510, and the small island of Penon off Algiers in 1511 is in keeping 
with the desire for expansion towards Mrica. Meanwhile, 1522 
marked the effective start of Suleiman the Magnificent's reign, 'inau-
gurated' with the conquest of the island of Rhodes. 
The Hospitallers 1 International Commitments 
Edward W Said in his book Orientalism portrays the Orient as 
quiescent while the West is seen to have been more dynamic7, 
At the opening of the sixteenth century, the question of Western su-
periority was scarcely the subject of diplomats' or generals' delibe-
rations. The East appeared to be more dynamic, capable of fore-
seeing through various initiatives a place on the international scene. 
Christendom sought to achieve a sort of balance of power in the re-
gion, even, if the case would be to partially support isolated Muslim 
kingdoms. Mter the conquests effected in the East by the Ottomans 
and in the West by Spain, the Central Mediterranean rulers began 
to appear to both Spain and Turkey as dispensable, and the disman-
tling of small states or kingdoms as practicable. The latter appeared 
to the big powers as rogue states. Both big powers wished to annex 
these states but at the same time devised policies preventing the 
7 E.W. SAID, Orienta/ism, London, 1995. 
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other from having the upper hand on these territories. However, 
these kingdoms, as many of the European city-states and town 
councils, remained isolated worlds not only politically but also eco~ 
nomically. They could not stand on their own for long. In part, this 
explains the intervention of both France and Spain in Italy and also 
explains why Charles V gave the isolated island of Malta to the 
Knights of St. John, who were homeless following the loss of 
Rhodes. It is within this context that the conflict between the Cross 
and the Crescent for the control of Iffriqya, Tripoli and Algiers 
should be seen. 
In the case of Malta, the island was until the arrival of the Knights 
Hospitallers governed by a town council called the Un iv ersita , 
whose autonomy had become anachronistic for sixteenth-century 
political thinking. The same political feeling existed about the Cen-
tral North Mrican regencies. A period of political and military ha-
rassment was initiated against them by both the Ottoman Turks and 
Christian Spain. The North African regencies represented anachro-
nistic governments, which like the island of Malta, needed new 
blood that the two big powers thought only they could transfuse. 
The discovery of America had a significant impact on Spain's 
policy of expansion and a form of modus vivendi had to be forged 
between the realms of Castile and Aragon, with the former focusing 
more on the Atlantic while the latter continued \\lith its traditional 
maritime operations in the Mediterranean. Within this framework 
falls Charles V's decision to give his Aragonese possession of the 
island of Malta to the Knights of St. John. It is significant that 
Charles V engaged with the Maltese situation when he was in Spain 
and that these islands did not figure in his strategy during his sojourn 
in the Imperial lands. Spain brought the Emperor nearer to Mediter-
ranean realities and to the difficulties that frontier territories posed 
to the crown in terms of defence. It was immediately after the Hospi~ 
tallers lost Rhodes, that is in 1523, that the Emperor held discussions 
with the Hospitaller Grandmaster, Philippe Villiers de l'Isle Adam, 
over the latter's request to have the islands of Malta and Tripoli8. Yet 
the distraught Knights, despite their precarious situation, only ac~ 
cepted their Grandmaster's plan after roaming for seven years, and 
when it became clear that no better option could be found. 
8 V. MALLIA-MILANES, Venice and Hospitaller Malta. 1530-1798. Aspects 0/ a Relation-
ship, Malta, 1992, p. 2. 
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In 1524, the Knights sent a commission to inspect the island. The 
commissioners' report falls neatly within the Braudelian description 
of an isolated world. Malta appeared to the Hospitallers both geo-
graphically and economically marginal. It was distant from Ottoman 
sphere of influence. Economically the island was not self-sufficient. 
Indeed whatever the size of the population, it could not have had 
the resources to sustain itself. Throughout its late medieval history, 
Malta had a population of around 10,000 to 15,000, living over a 
surface area of 316 km2• Despite the fact that Malta had on average 
of about one inhabitant for 0.025 km2 9, it still needed to rely on im-
portation for its survival. Perhaps, the need for victuals from Sicily 
broke the total isolation of the Maltese islands but still did not hin-
der them appearing in the eyes of European aristocrats, as the Hos-
pitaller Knights were, a backwater on the periphery of the new 
emerging Europe. Yet the Knights' change of mind (determined by 
the sole important asset of the islands, the unexploited natural har-
bours) would secure a new historical reality. This small isolated 
world found itself unexpectedly on the trading routes of bigger na-
tions, with the result that a new era dawned on Malta. 
The following analysis of the main events which would place Mal-
ta more centrally in the international sphere was undertaken on the 
basis of both the official history, as recorded by the Hospitallers 
chroniclers, mainly Giacomo BosioIO and Bartolomeo dal Pozzoll) as 
well as unedited material extracted from the ecclesiastical records. 
While the former recorded the gesta of the Hospitaller rulers, in par-
ticular the Knights' martial policy throughout the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth century, the latter documents disclosed the social history 
of common people. These documents, in particular the Status Liberi, 
help the historian to determine whether post-1530 society was in-
deed cosmopolitanised. 
On the political level, the Hospitaller chroniclers were more than 
ready to record events that, even if they failed to achieve their final 
political aim, still show the importance that the island began to as-
sume after 1530. It was not long after the Hospitallers had set foot 
9 This calculation was llildertaken on an average population of 12.500. Today's popula. 
tion density is that of one person per 0.0012 km2• 
10 G. BosIO, Dell'Istoria del/a Sacra Religione et Ill.ma Militia di S. Giovanni Gerosoli-
mitano> Rama, 1602, IlL 
11 B. DAL Pozzo, Historia della Sacra Religione Milltare di S. Giovanni Gerosolimitano 
delta di Malta, Verona, 1703-15. 
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on Malta that the island featured in international and inter-imperial 
conflict. From an isolated world, it became a frontier territory and a 
stepping-stone for the Christian armies in their wars against powers 
on the Barbary Coast and the Ottoman Empire. In August 1531, 
Malta found itself at the forefront of the European War against the 
Sublime Porte. For the first time, Malta was chosen as the military 
base for a small squadron of six galleys sent by the Viceroy of Sicily 
and Genoa, but also including two Maltese brigantines, to attack 
the city of Modon. In the following year, the island again played a 
part in the much more inlportant international operation organised 
by Andrea Doria against Caron. As this expedition proved to be a 
temporary victory, the Hospitaller galleys were again in action, with 
Andrea Doria and the Papal galleys sent to rescue the conquered 
city of Caron from the inevitable fall into the hands of the Ottoman 
Turks in 1533. 
The chronology of international participation continues unabated 
onto the following decades. In 1535, the Knights answered the call 
of Emperor Charles V for the recapture of Tunis to restore the de-
posed Hafsida monarch, Mulay Hasan on his throne. The fleet, af-
ter gathering at Capo Pula in Sardinia, proceeded to attack Tunis 
and to build a Spanish presidium on La Goletta. In 1540, Sousse 
and Monastir in Tunis were raided by Christian galleys) while the 
city of Sfax was put under siege. In 1541) Charles V sought once 
again to extend his territories to North Africa and on the 26 Au-
gust, his fleet departed from Malta towards Algiers. Despite the fact 
that the latter attack turned out to be a disaster, as only the castle of 
Tagiura in Tripoli was attacked, the new geopolitical axis with Malta 
at the centre of this maritime activity continued to hold for more 
years to come. Four years later, the Knights used Malta to attack the 
city of Lmaia near Tripoli. In 1550, it was the turn of Monastir to be 
attacked again. The fortified city Mahdiyyah was put under siege 
until it surrendered, but it was a pyrrhic victory. In 1552, the Hospi-
taller forces attacked Zuaga on the western side of Tripoli. 
The next Christian armada to set sail against North Africa was in 
1559. Taking the opportunity of the signing of the Treaty of Cateau 
Cambresis, Grandmaster La Valette solicited Philip II to arm an ar-
mada to recapture Tripoli,. which had been lost to North African 
corsairs in 155 L Despite the disastrous outcome of the campaign, 
the army occupied the island of Djerba temporarily. 
In 1563, the Hospitaller galleys were again involved in conflict. 
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They participated on the side of Spain in the war against Morocco 
and disembarked at Penon de Velez. The Order found it difficult to 
renew military aid to Spain in 1564. During that year) the Hospi~ 
tallers were concerned by the persistent rumours of an impending 
Ottoman attack on Malta. In that same year) their attention was to-
tally focused on the Levant and this in part explains their unilateral 
expedition against the city of Malvasia in the Peloponnese. In 1565, 
the tables were turned. The island itself became the centre of inter~ 
national attention. The decision of Sulieman the Magnificent to at-
tack Malta, turned the attention of Christian Europe on this small 
world. Thanks to the printing press, the siege of Malta became the 
most discussed event in Europe at the time12. 
The official historian of the Knights for the post-siege period was 
another Italian, Bartolomeo dal Pozzo. Bosio's history ends in 1571. 
Dal Pozzo's account covers the period from 1571 to 1688. His per-
spective of the historical events tallied with that of Bosio, and his ac-
count is not less glorifying. goes into great detail to record for 
posterity the Hospitallers' international engagements but at the same 
time focuses on the help given by Knights to Christian monarchs, 
in particular when the outcome was favourable. More importandy, 
dal Pozzo's chronicle of events neady falls within the new phase of in-
ternational developments that engulfed the war in the Mediterranean. 
Echoing Braudel, Salvatore Bono divided the maritime conflict in 
the Mediterranean into two phases. The first phase was the one just 
described above. The sixteenth-century military endeavours in the 
Mediterranean were primarily driven by the desire for the conquest 
of territory, the urge of both Spain and the Sublime Porte to have a 
foothold in North Mrica. The second period starts in the seven-
teenth century, that is after the planned attack by Gian Andrea Do-
ria against Algiers in 1601. From this date onwards, the European 
attacks against North Mrican cities are judged as corsairing actions, 
aimed mainly at the taking of booty but without seeking territorial 
conquest13 . In this new war, Malta found a new political and eco-
nomic niche. 
12 A. GANADO· M. AGIUS-VADALIA, A Study in Depth 0/143 Maps Representing the 
Great Siege o/Malto 0/1565, Malta, 1994-95. 
13 S. BONO, Corsart nel Mediterraneo. eristioni e musulmani Ira guerra, schiavitu e com-
mercio, Milano, 1993, p. 30: «altri attacchi europei contro Ie cit/a maghrebine vonno piuttosto 
giudicati come ozioni corsare, per procurare un bottino d' uomini e di ben; che non come i'm-
prese volte a stroncare l'ottivita dei barbareschi». 
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On a more localised level, these military encounters between the 
East and the West, but also the religious conflicts in Europe, began 
to influence the daily life of some of the local people to the extent 
of being reflected in a number of court procedures. It is here my in-
tention to move a little bit away from the official chronology of 
events and try to assert the direct impact that these international 
events had on the common people. The Status Libert' furnish impor-
tant insights into certain perceptions of the local population. They 
can help the historian to assert whether the man in the street was 
conscious of the new role that his home country was having in 
Europe. This is possible as the Status Liberi are written requests 
for marriage by locals who had been absent from Malta for some 
time, foreigners who wanted to setde here, or local widows whose 
husbands had died abroad. In all instances, the plaintiffs had to 
deposit a short dossier about their origins and life experience. Indi-
rectly' a corpus of records of first-hand experiences of a number of 
international engagements was thereby left for posterity. It is to 
these documents that I shall now refer to. 
The first international event which left its mark on the Status 
Liberi documentation was the Battle of Lepanto; it is described in 
the acts as the giorno della presa dell' armata turca14 . For the first 
time, the local records recount, through the viewpoint of widows, 
the grief suffered following the loss of a beloved husband. It was a 
battle that had an unfortunate outcome for the Knights as they 
practically lost their fleet, bringing in requests from the women who 
were widowed to have their right of remarriage recognised by the 
local ecclesiastical authorities. 
On the political level, the Battle of Lepanto enhanced the cen-
trality of the Maltese harbours as a port of call for the Western Me-
diterranean Powers against Islam; a warning of more wars ahead. 
The losses suffered at Lepanto prevented the Hospital1ers from 
sending any galleys to support Don John of Austria's expedition 
against Tunis. Once this enterprise failed, the Hospitallers took ad-. 
vantage of the change of policy between the two Mediterranean 
Powers, in which both Spain and the Ottoman Empire sought to 
achieve a truce in the Mediterranean, and embroiled themselves 
in a diplomatic imbroglio whose purpose was to reinstate the royal 
14 ARCHlVUM ARCIEPISCOPALIS MELITENSIS FLOlUANA (AAM), Status Libert' (SL) , 13.XI.1579. 
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house of the Hafsida in Tunis. The whole plot was short lived and 
the Knights were once again crossing swords with the Crescent. 
The Status Libert' make reference to the raid on the town of Al-
giers in 157915. In 1584, the Greek town of Monsalda in the chan-
nel of Caramania was sacked, while in 1590, the Knights tried 
in vain to recover Tripoli by a coup which had to initiate with the 
taking of the island of Zauga. However, the most important ven-
tures date to the seventeenth century, that is, when the swirling tide 
of corsairing attacks began to gather momentum. In 1602, the 
Order's galleys were at the doors of Hamamet. It was a venture to 
be repeated again with greater ferocity in 1606. The savagery of this 
latter event and the defensive stand undertaken by the inhabitants 
left a discernible impact, recorded in the Status Liberi. These chron-
icles record the predicament of widows who lost their husbands 
during this attack16• Witnesses recounted the tragic end of some un-
fortunate soldiers who ended up butchered in the counterattacks of 
the Ottoman cavalry. In 1610, the fleet conducted a successful at-
tack on the city of Corinth in Greece, ravaging and pillaging the 
town. During this engagement some sailors who were married to 
Maltese women were killed17 . For the second decade of the seven-
teenth century, the Status Libert' documents contain details of raids 
undertaken in 1619 on Terra di Susa18 in Tunis and Tornese Castle 
in Morea19, while during the late 1620s the Greek island of Santa 
Maura was raided2o• 
These were not the sole warring endeavours undertaken by the 
Knights, even if they were the bloodiest. Del Pozzo records attacks 
on the cities of Lepanto, Patrasso, Montasir and the island of Cos in 
160321 , in Morea and the Kirkennah islands in 1611, in Fogie in the 
Gulf of Smyrne in 161322 • The fact that no references to these pil-
lages were found in the Status Libert" documents, can be an indica-
tion that they had less social repercussions in Malta than the one 
discussed above. 
15 AAM, SL, 29.xn.1584. 
16 AAM,SL, 18.x.1608. 
17 AAM, SL, 24.X.1614. 
18 AAM, SL, 29.IV.1620 (B. OAL Pozzo, Historia della Sacra Religione Militare cit., I, p. 683). 
19 AAM,SL, 1621 (B. DAL Pozzo, Historia della Sacra Religione Militare cit., I, p. 655). 
20 AAM,SL, 8.VI.1629. 
21 B. OAL Pozzo, Historia della Sacra Religione Militare cit., I, p. 497. 
22 B. OAL Pozzo, Historia della Sacra Religione Militare cit., I, pp. 575-577. 
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On the international level, the Hospitallers' depredations were 
again in evidence towards the middle of the seventeenth century. In 
1645, a corsairing incident of which Hospitaller galleys were pro-
tagonists sparked a long war in the Mediterranean which ended 
with the complete conquest of Crete by the Turks in 166923 , The 
subsequent reaction of Venice, which launched a costly war in 
Morea, found the full support of the HospitaIlers' council and mari~ 
time squadron24. The Hospitallers also participeted in the war in 
Belgrade, making the Knights full participants in the last interna-
tional wars fought between the Cross and the Crescent in Early 
Modern Times. 
Within this framework of maritime activity, the Status Liberi 
make direct reference to the Mediterranean policy applied by Pedro 
Giron II, Duke of Osuna and Viceroy of Naples between 1616 and 
1619. Once again these references bring to the foreground the cen-
trality of Malta in the tnounting of large-scale operations. The 
Duke's ambitions to enhance Spain's power in the Mediterranean 
were first made clear when he was Viceroy of Sicily between 1612 
and 1616, and emerged more strongly when he became Viceroy of 
Naples. This policy had a direct relevance for Malta, as the Duke 
sought to enhance Spanish hegemony in the Mediterranean by de-
veloping a strong fleet to defy the Venetian and Ottoman powers. 
Such a foreign policy fitted in well with the Hospitallers' goals, as 
Venice's diplomatic and commercial relations with the Porte was 
considered in the early seventeenth century an obstacle in the on-
going war against Islam. As Malta became a port of call for the 
Duke di Osuna's fleet, some sailors in service decided to settle per-
manently in Malta after finding Maltese spouses25. Theirs was not 
an isolated experience. The Duke of Savoy was another partner in 
the Western Alliance against Islam. His ships formed part of a num-
ber of Catholic fleets that sought to strike against Ottoman might, 
as was the case in 1601 and 1619. Some Piedmontese sailors and 
soldiers settled in Malta after withdrawing from service with the 
forces of the Duke26. In particular, the plaintiff Giovanni Ruet and 
23 E. ROSSI, Storia del/a Marina del/JOrdine di S. Giovanni di Gerusalemme di Rodi e di 
Malta, Roma-Milano, 1926, p. 76; V. MALLIA-MILANES, Venice cit., pp. 150-170. 
24 E. ROSSI, Stono della Marina cit., p. 81. 
25 AAM, SL, 3.XI.1622; 12.XI.1622; 24.11L1622; 10.1.1622; 28.L1622; 29.IV.1623; 
21.IIL1624; 3.II.1624; 14.X.1624. 
26, AAM, SL, [?].10.1596; 4.VIII.1603; 20.111.1618; 27.III.1618; 2.VII1.1618. 
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his friend Giovanni F abro confessed to having participated in the 
war of Piedmont on the side of the Grand Duke of Savoy27. 
The European Impact 
Painstaking research in the Status Liberi can also help in the re~ 
constitution of certain aspects of the Hospitallers' naval history in 
relation to the European continent. Politically, the division between 
East and West in the Mediterranean was well established by the 
1600s. It is important to note that at this stage in time, the Turkish 
defeat at the Battle of Lepanto and the defeat of the Spanish Armada 
have become synonymous in Mediterranean history with the decline 
in Early Modern Times of two important Mediterranean Powers. 
However, it must also be kept in mind that the decline was not sud-
den; it developed over a number of decades for Spain and over the 
course of centuries for Turkey. This decline benefited France, Britain 
and Holland, but in their case, the ascendancy occurred over deca-
des of internal reforms and costly wars. 
The Status Liberi can furnish a barometer of the fortunes of the 
'Northerners' in Malta, a term used to describe the owners of big 
ships that began to call in the Mediterranean in the second half of 
the sixteenth century. The first to enter were the English at the be-
ginning of the 1570s, followed by the Flemish around the 1590s. 
The reference to English ships in Status Liberi dates back to the ear-
ly sixteenth century. In 1604, the death of Ambrogio Arbamiense 
from Vittorio sa was recorded. Arbamiense was a sailor on a ship 
bearing a cargo of wheat, and died fighting when his ship fought 
against an English vascello near Capo Passero in Sicily28. Similar 
stories were reported by other widows, who lost their husbands in 
160829 and 1611, fighting against English vessels30. There were also 
English sailors, probably deserters who were enlisted on the Hospi-
tallers' or other southern Mediterranean fleets. Some of these ap-
pear in the court records both as plaintiffs or witnesses. In 1607, 
two English sailors demanded authorisation to marry in Malta31• 
27 AAM. SL, 2.VIII.1618. 
28 AAM, SL, 2 LVII. 1604. 
29 AAM, SL, 14.VIII.l60B. 
30 AAM, SL, 24.lII.161L 
31 AAM, SL, 17.VII.1607. 
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One of the plaintiffs, Giacobo Giaches explicitly declared that 
he had worked on an Hospitaller galley, Both plaintiffs had fellow 
English witnesses to stand in their favour before the ecclesiastical 
court32• Flemish sailors originating from Holland are mentioned for 
the first time in the Status Liberi in the same year as the English33, 
Unfortunately, the study of this latter group is more difficult to un-
dertake, as sailors from the Low Countries and the United Pro-
vinces were rarely distinguished by nationality, but identified as hav-
ing Flemish ethnicity. 
The religious divisions that ravaged Europe after 1517 were trans-
lated into a language of war which reached the Central Mediter-
ranean with the arrival of the English and the Flemish big ships, for 
they represented a religious enemy. This is also the reason why Mal-
tese vessels were having violent skirmishes with ships from Prote-
stant nations. The reaction to Protestantism even reached the peo-
ple of Malta, leading villagers to join foreign armies in order to fight 
what appeared in their eyes the enemy of the Catholic faith. This 
was the case of Francesco Zupardo from Casal Burdi, who enlisted 
as a soldier in the service of the French king, Louis XIII, and only 
returned to Malta in 1637 in order to marry. The Hospitallers were 
directly involved in this war for in 1620, the Grandmaster Alof de 
Wignacourt sent the Hospitaller Gran Galleone to assist the French 
king in these religious wars34. Such participation seems to have in-
fluenced, even if mildly) French migratory trends to Malta. A year 
after the Hospitallers' participation in this war, a pensioned-off 
soldier, Daniele Briffuli from Bordeaux was seeking to establish a 
permanent settlement in Malta35 . In 1622, Briffuli declared to the 
Maltese Ecclesiastical court that he had fought in Toulouse against 
what he defined as the «guerre contre luterani». This can be read as 
a direct reference to the Huguenot \vars in France36. 
These wars and naval activities influenced mariners to settle in 
Malta, confirming the centrality that Malta was beginning to have 
not only for the European wars but also for commerce. But as was 
often revealed in these acts, migrants followed tortuous routes. 
Sailors in particular confessed to the ecclesiastical court that they 
32 AAM, SL, 7.IV.1607. 
33 AAM, SL. 28.IX.1607. 
34 J. MUSCAT, It-Flotta ta' l-Ordni ta' San Gwann. Malta. 2000! p. 102. 
35 AAM, SL, 9.IIL1638. 
36 AAM. SL, 8.VIIL1634; 16.IVJ638; 20.X.1638; 21.Xl1640. 
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had undertaken other travels, and lived in other ports prior to set-
ding down in Malta. Broadly speaking, there existed four different 
itineraries. The first route was for the sailors and soldiers to come 
directly to Malta. This route was mostly preferred by Sicilians and 
those who had been working as soldiers prior to seeking service on 
the Hospitaller galleys. The second concerned crewmen who had 
been sailing the western Mediterranean. Usually these were Spa-
niards or French sailors who would finally embark on a vessel head-
ing to Malta from an Italian port. The French, for example, showed 
a preference for the town of Genoa, where they used to spend some 
months, prior to their coming to Malta. It was the continuous use of 
the Genoese ports by the Hospitaller galleys that attracted French-
men to Malta. The third route concerned sailors in the Levant, the 
majority of whom were southern European corsairs whose national-
ity varied, though their number included also central and eastern 
Europeans engaged in mercantile shipping. Greek sailors predomi-
nated within this latter category: being Christian but at the same 
time subjects of the Ottoman Empire, they could act as intermedi-
aries between the Latin West and the Muslim East. The last type of 
sailors would have travelled all over the Mediterranean. They pre-
ferred to figuratively describe themselves as having been «to other 
parts of the world»37 which meant working on different boats that 
sailed to both Christian and Muslim harbours. 
Catlin g the Shots 
It was a past tendency among historians, but also among six-
teenth- and seventeenth-century travellers to depict people living on 
frontier territories as exotic, different, traditional, sensual and fanatic 
in an ignorant sort of way. In other words, the images given of these 
frontier territories, irrespective of whether they were in Europe or 
in North Africa, were of a passive backward world, monolithic 
in nature and exotic in its alienism. This was the image left by Nicola 
de Nicolay of the Central Mediterranean world. His detailed de-
scriptions were sent to the press in Antwerp in 1576. 
This apparent 'cultural backwardness' receded with the develop-
37 AAM, SL, 27.II.1603; 30.III.1622; 3.II.1624; 7.IX.1624; 19.XI.1624; 20.VIII.1624; 
20.1.1634; 8.V.1635; 13.VI.16.36; 13.xn.1636; 10.11.1637; 12.II.1637; 14.IV.1640; 3.VII. 
1640. 
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ment of new cities in Malta, introducing to the island new cosmo-
politan urban centres focusing around the new city of Valletta. But 
this new image could only be achieved by the input of the migrants 
whom I wish in this part to focus on, in particular through their 
contribution in breaking down Malta's insularity. All this occurred 
in the shadow of the Hospitallers' fabric. From the moment they set 
foot in Malta, the Knights of St. John called the shots. 
In concrete terms, the Hospitallers' policy to turn the Island into 
a Mediterranean centre can be summarized in three words; implicit, 
ministerial and documentary. It was implicit as the presence of the 
Hospitaller Knights, the flower of the European aristocracy, was 
in itself an economic and a cultural asset. The main source of the 
Hospitallers' revenue came from the Order's extensive territories all 
over Europe. 
The way by which the Order carried out the financing of the Is-
land is perhaps the most implicit example that helped Malta break 
away from the Braudelian model of an isolated world. The Knights 
of St. John had a ring-fenced finance system. As an ecclesiastical in-
stitution, its vast European territories were supposedly to be only 
enjoyed by the Hospitaller members of the Order. This implies that 
part of their revenue had to be shipped to the Convent. For the first 
time Malta had a direct source of income. 
Thanks to these financial resources, a constellation of fortifica-
tions was built all over the island, making Malta impregnable to cor-
sairing intrusion. Money was also employed towards the changing of 
the: local landscape. A new geographical and cultural scenario came 
into being, which made Malta more attractive to the more refined 
visitors. Foreign travellers began to call in Malta and the island 
found its place on the Grand Tour route. 
The Hospitallers' policy was also ministerial as the Knights took 
over the real administration of the island. The head of Malta was no 
longer living in a distant land, as was the case before 1530, but was 
directly present on the island38. It was in Malta that the Hospitallers 
set their seat of power. This direct presence meant that any adminis-
trative, juridical or political issue was to be resolved by the Grand-
master, who acted as an autonomous prince or despotic monarch. 
The Knights began to implement from above the necessary political 
38 C. DALU, Iz-Zmien No/sani Malti, Malta, 2002, p. 217. 
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refoons, establishing a hierarchical system which while being anti-de~ 
mocratic in essence - there was more democracy in the Middle Ages -
effected the necessary changes and reforms, in particular in the judi-
cial field where the most prominent European jurists were commis-
sioned to draft Maltese legislation. In the field of art, the Order 
sought the direct services of the best Italian artists, and the list 
includes Michelangelo Merisi da Caravaggio, Mattia Preti, and Gio-
vanni Battista Piranesi. It employed the best European architects and 
military engineers, among whom were Antonio Ferramolino, Bar-
tolomeo Genga, Francesco Laparelli, Romano Carapecchia, and Mau-
rizio Valperga. In the field of medicine, important foreign doctors 
were called to the island, as the sixteenth-century plague expert, 
Pietro Parisi. In the eighteenth century, the advice of the famous 
French physician Vic d' Azir was sought on mephitic diseases. The 
Knights were not afraid to import into Malta new technologies from 
Europe, as in the building of an aqueduct system or investing in new 
shipbuilding techniques. In the eighteenth century, the state directly 
intervened to set up a proper university where scientific matters, in 
particular medicine and mathematics, were given extensive impor-
tance. 
Finally, in the function of modern states, these reforms were ex-
tensively documented, both by keeping the relevant archives but al-
so by informing the public, during the recurring issues of proclama-
tions, about the rulers' exigencies and law implementation. The 
above-mentioned reforms and activities were communicated to the 
local population by extending the use of the town's criers and the 
printing press. The Knights had desperately sought to introduce the 
printing press in Malta, while seeking an absolute monopoly on it to 
exercise better control ov~r the Maltese elite. 
The presence of foreigners in Malta testified to the success of the 
Hospitallers' policies. On the international field, the Hospitallers 
opened embassies or had diplomatic representatives in all the prin-
cipal Catholic cities of Europe. These buildings helped to make the 
name of Malta better known abroad. A cultural and economic lega-
cy began to be developed abroad propagating the name of the 
island of Malta. In return, Malta ceased to appear to the major Eu-
ropean Courts an 'isolated world', an unknown entity or a place of 
little importance. This new perception extended all along the main 
harbour cities of the Mediterranean. The latter became the princi-
pal catchments from where the Hospital1ers recruited most of the 
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people to fill posts in the expanding economic, cultural and mari-
time sectors. The island began to offer opportunities not only to 
military personnel, but also to traders, artisans and sailors engaged 
in commercial shipping. A twofold situation developed: the Knights 
encouraged the settlement of migrants in Malta, who in turn passed 
their skills to the Maltese; or else the local or foreign gentry sup-
ported members from the endogenous community or even from 
amongst the migrant families to study abroad. In both fields, the 
Hospitallers successfully called the shots. 
The inhabitants of the Mediterranean were accused of being dis-
inclined to leave their confines and whenever they did so the soil of 
their native land remained too tightly clung to their shoes. Trade, 
wars and education set people moving. Yet the most important cul-
tural change came through schooling; this educational horizon was 
unexpectedly, geographically extended. Until 1530, the endogenous 
population had rarely gone beyond the Sicilian shoreline. Already in 
the first decades of their rule, young students were sent abroad to 
study. Local architects and artists received financial support from 
the Knights or the local Church to specialise in the principal Euro-
pean countries, foremost in Rome. In the medical field, the Univer-
sity of Montpellier had a great impact on the local curriculum. It 
received its first students from Malta in the 1540s and remained 
popular with the Maltese elite up to the late eighteenth century39. 
Even in the field of theology, Sicily lost much of its pride of place. 
Throughout the late Middle Ages, Sicilian dioceses were the pre-
ferred destination for those aspiring to the priesthood. By the 
second half of the sixteenth century, Rome but also the Sorbonne 
University began to figure more prominently in the local records. 
Between 1555 and 1560, two Maltese students, Pietro Terrana40 and 
Pietro Micallef41, received a scholarship from the Bishop of Malta to 
study theology in Paris. Between 1606 and 1610, another young 
Maltese pupil, Giovanni Matteo Rispoli, son of a third generation 
family of Neapolitan migrants, was sent to study theology at the Sor-
bonne in Paris42. It is not my intention to focus on the achievements 
39 R. ELLUL-MICALLEF, Men from Montpellier, forthcoming. 
40 ARCmvUM CATTEDRALIS MELITENSIS (ACM), Misc. 275, f. 90. 
41 ACM. Misc. 275, f. 90v. 
42 ELM. DE RISPOLIS, Status Controverriae Praede/initionum et Praedeterminationum 
cum Libero Arbitrio, Paris, 1609. 
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of these three men. Neither is it my desire to account for their abi· 
lities and success. Their academic endeavours were deemed appro· 
priate to the Sorbonne Alma Mater, as their works were seen to be a 
true expression of the theological issues that where inflaming the 
Christian west at the end of the sixteenth century. They struggled to 
keep Malta abreast of the dogma of the Catholic Church. Rispoli, in 
particular, had studied the debates engulfing the Jesuit and the 
Dominican theologians of his time i.e.) the nature of free will. His 
work found acclaim in Paris to the extent of being published by one 
of the printing houses in Rue Jacob. 
The Rispoli were not the only family of foreign migrants to make 
headway in Malta. The surname of Pietro Terrana, the above-
mentioned Maltese who was sent to Paris, implies endogenous ori-
gins. The next two centuries would produce other families, of ex· 
ogenous origins, who would climb the social ladder. Here I would 
like to mention three. The Desain and Percomotti families can be 
cited as seventeenth·century examples of humble maestri who set-
tled in Malta and through their alliances with the Church and State 
enhanced their family's social status43 . The Prepaud family can be 
taken as an example of an eighteenth-century migrant family in 
Malta, who moved to a high level of commercial excellence by 
exploiting their trading relations with the Levan04. 
Conclusion 
According to Braudel, «the commonest way in which the islands 
entered the life of the outside world was by emigration»45. «All the 
islands - continues Braudel - exported their people». Even if the 
migration records leave much to be desired, this was the case of 
Malta in Early Modern Times, with the difference that unlike many 
of the other islands, the out-migration flow in Malta was counter-
balanced by a bigger in-migration input. As I sought to highlight in 
this paper, the breaking out of Malta from its cocoon of isolation 
43 S. MERCIECA, The Possession o/Titles in Early Modern Malta, forthcoming. 
44 S. MERCIECA, Commerce in eighteenth-century Malta. The Story 0/ the Prepaud Family, 
in Consolati di Mare and Chambers 0/ Commerce, Conference (Valletta, 1998), ed. C. Vassallo, 
Malta, 2000, pp. 185-197. 
45 F. BRAUDEL, The Mediterranean cit., I, p. 158. 
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can be summarised by referring to two factors. The first was its 
participation in international or regional military operations. The 
second one was in the better use of its human resources. The latter 
can be considered as the most difficult to achieve, in particular in a 
historical context where the Mediterranean seashore provinces were 
often short of men46• In the context of such disadvantages, the mi-
gratory experience is more significant than commonly thought. It 
played a significant role in placing Malta on the European map. 
While the military aspect had been extensively analysed, the con-
tribution of the migrants to the development of Maltese culture and 
economy was often underestimated, with the exception of some im-
portan t artists or very skilled craftsmen whose media of communi M 
cation made their impact more durable. Yet, this success is also due 
to endogenous families and other migrants whose experiences have 
never attracted the attention of historians, and who form part of 
that group whom Eric R. Wolf defines as people without history47. 
For some of the migrants, Malta may have been a disappoint-
ment, but for the many who stayed, the island was a place that of-
fered them hope and the love of their life. Studying the parish 
records, one can conclude that the settlers did not try to recreate 
their native cultures. They had a 'complementary identity', that is, 
they viewed themselves, or else were forced to view themselves, as 
Maltese. The fact that they were of the same religion as the Maltese, 
helped them to better integrate with the native community. Secondly, 
the Latinisation policy carried out by the Church led to some har-
monisation of different ethnicities, even among the Italians, who in 
Early Modern Times did not perceive themselves as a nation. One 
can also affirm that no form of overt ethnic tension was present in 
Malta. Behind this fact lay the strong familial ties operating within 
local kinship patterns. Marriage gave to most of the migrants, irreM 
spective of their ethnic origins, one mindset; in principle, they were 
seeking a better life, and without doubt many found through mar-
riage not only a partner but also thanks to the presence of the 
Knights, a welcoming cosmopolitan environment that made their 
stay in Malta much easier. Perhaps, while in-migration went hand in 
hand with the described military operations, the ultimate success lay 
in the solid contribution of these migrants, and the ability of the 
46 F. BRAUDEL, The Mediterranean cit., I, p. 147. 
47 E.R. WOLF, Europe and the People without History, Berkeley, 1997. 
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local inhabitants to peacefully assimilate them. This aided the Mal-
tese Islands' emergence from their medieval isolation. This was a 
well~known and visible fact, which did not escape the eyes of an 
eighteenth-century traveller, Patrick Brydone, who rightly described 
eighteenth-century Malta as «an epitome of all Europe»48. 
48 P. BRYDONE, Tour through Sicily and Malta. London, 1773, II, p. 338. 
